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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES - DOWNSTATE 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY), 
Respondent. 
HITE & CASEY, P.C. (CHRISTOPHER H. GARDNER of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (Department 
of Correctional Services - Downstate Correctional Facility) (State) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Council 82), alleging that the State violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed the procedure for requesting sick 
leave for scheduled medical appointments. Finding that the State had changed the 
requirements for using sick leave for scheduled visits with a health care provider, a 
CASE NO. U-18683 
, Board - U-18683 -2 
mandatory subject of negotiation, the ALJ determined that the State had violated the 
Act as alleged. 
The State excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in finding 
that requests for sick leave use for scheduled medical visits is a mandatory subject of 
.._ ^negotiation, _that_§21.3. oftheMewJYork_State Departmentof. Civil Service-Attendance 
and Leave Manual (Manual)1 authorizes it to require proof to justify the use of sick leave 
credits, and that its actions were necessary to curb sick leave abuse, a management 
prerogative. Council 82 has not responded to the State's exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the State's 
exceptions, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
x From April 1987 to January 9 ,1997, unit employees at the State's Downstate 
Correctional Facility who used more than four hours of sick leave for a scheduled 
1That section, in relevant part, provides: 
Before absence for personal illness may be charged against 
accumulated sick leave credits, the appointing authority may 
require such proof of illness as may be satisfactory to it, or may 
require the employee to be examined, at the expense of the 
department or agency, by a physician designated by the 
appointing authority. In the event of failure to submit proof of 
illness upon request, or in the event that, upon such proof as is 
submitted or upon the report of medical examination, the 
appointing authority finds that there is not satisfactory evidence of 
illness sufficient to justify the employee's absence from the 
performance of his duties, such absence may be considered as 
unauthorized leave and shall not be charged against 
accumulated sick leave credits. Abuse of sick leave privileges 
shall be cause for disciplinary action. 
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medical appointment were required to provide documentation upon their return to work.2 
If the employee was on the Time and Attendance list,3 he or she needed to provide 
documentation regardless of the length of the medical appointment. 
Effective January 9, 1997, the State required that all requests by unit employees 
atits Downstate C o r c e ^ 
a health care provider must be accompanied by the name and office phone number of 
the health care provider and the time of the appointment or an appointment card that 
contains the same information. Council 82 alleges that the change in the type of 
documentation required and the circumstances under which it is required are changes 
in a mandatory subject of negotiation. J 
It is well settled that sick leave is a mandatory subject of negotiation.4 It is 
likewise well established that the procedures and policies for granting or terminating 
sick leave are mandatory.5 The new requirements for documentation instituted by the 
State affect both sick leave and sick leave procedures and are, therefore, mandatory 
subjects of negotiation. The State was, therefore, required to negotiate the new sick 
leave procedures with Council 82 before they were implemented, unless there is merit 
to any of its other defenses. 
2The documentation required was a dated and signed note on the doctor's 
stationery, stating the nature of the visit and its duration. 
3This list is for employees whose time and attendance is being monitored by the 
State. 
^Village of Spring Valley Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, 14 PERB P010 (1981). 
5Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., 27 PERB 1J3076 (1994). 
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The State argues that its January 9, 1997 memorandum was issued pursuant to 
the authorization in §21.3(d) of the Manual, which allows the State to require proof of 
illness satisfactory to it prior to allowing an employee to charge an absence for an 
appointment with a health care provider. Although §21.3(d) of the Manual gives the 
State the_authoritytor^ 
leave, it does not privilege the State to act unilaterally with respect to changes in 
mandatory subjects of negotiation.6 The State has discretion to determine what 
constitutes satisfactory proof of a scheduled appointment before such absences may 
be charged to accumulated sick leave. It is the existence of this discretion which 
enables the State to bargain. Were there no discretion, there would be nothing to 
negotiate. The only question we need decide,7 therefore, becomes whether the State's 
exercise of that discretion must be bargained or whether §21.3(d) of the Manual plainly 
and clearly exempts the State from its statutory duty to bargain. There is no explicit 
language exempting the State from its bargaining obligation and nothing inescapably 
implicit in the Manual which establishes a plain and clear intent to exempt the State 
from the strong public policy favoring the negotiation of all terms and conditions of 
6Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist, 21 PERB 1J3036 (1988), conf'd, 22 PERB 
1J7009 (Alb. County Sup. Ct. 1989), motion to dismiss appeal granted by default, 25 
PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't 1992). 
7Given our disposition of this question, we have no occasion to consider whether 
provisions of the Manual or any regulatory provisions pertaining thereto could serve to 
exempt the State from its duties under the Act. See Town of Cortlandt, 30 PERB 1J3031 
(1997). 
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employment.8 Therefore, we hold that the State is not privileged pursuant to the 
Manual to change the sick leave use procedures without negotiations with Council 82.9 
The State argues lastly that it has the managerial right to control sick leave 
abuse and that the procedures it implements in that regard are not mandatory subjects 
of bargaining. In County of Nassau,™ an employer's right to control sick leave abuse 
was acknowledged. However, that same decision emphasizes that it is only demands 
or practices which can cause an employer to relinquish all control over sick leave abuse 
which are nonmandatory. Moreover, it was also noted in County of Nassau, as 
applicable here, that where an employer acts to discourage or regulate sick leave 
abuse by implementing or unilaterally changing a mandatory subject of negotiation, a 
8City of Schenectady v. PERB, 85 N.Y.2d 480, 28 PERB fl7005 (1995). 
94 NYCRR §26.3, provides: 
[T]he provision of these attendance Rules, insofar as they 
apply to employees in the negotiating units established 
pursuant to Article 14 of the Civil Service Law shall be 
continued; provided, however, that during periods of time 
when there is in effect an agreement between the State and 
an employee organization reached pursuant to the 
provisions of said Article 14, the provisions of such 
agreement and the provisions of such rules shall both be 
applicable. In the event the provisions of the agreement are 
different from the provisions of the attendance rules, the 
provisions of the agreement shall be controlling. 
The State argues that because there is no provision in the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement relating to medical documentation, the 
provisions of §26.3 apply and that it is free to require whatever proof it 
deems is sufficient for the use of sick leave for medical appointments. We 
reject this argument for the reasons stated in our discussion of §21.3(d). 
1018 PERB 1J3034 (1985). 
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violation of the Act occurs. In County of Nassau, in an attempt to address sick leave 
abuse, the County sought to regulate work schedules, a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. But for a contractual waiver of the right to negotiate the change in 
schedules, the County would have violated its duty to negotiate. Here, the State has 
.changed. its_sjckJeave_use_p_rocedure 
the benefit of any waiver defense. Accordingly, we hold that the State violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act when it changed the documentation requirements for the use of 
sick leave for scheduled appointments with a health care provider. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the State's exceptions and affirm the decision 
oftheALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State: 
1. Forthwith rescind, as to Council 82 unit employees, its January 8, 1997 
memorandum relating to time off for scheduled appointments with health 
care providers. 
2. Forthwith restore the practice as it existed prior to January 8, 1997 with 
respect to time off for scheduled appointments with health care providers 
for Council 82 unit employees. 
3. Forthwith make all unit employees whole for any wages and benefits lost as 
a result of the January 8, 1997 memorandum. 
Board - U-18683 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations within the Downstate 
Correctional Facility normally used to post notices of information to unit 
employees. 
-7 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
,Albany,.N_ew.York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Department of Correctional Services - Downstate 
Correctional Facility) (State) in the unit represented by Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82) that 
the State will: 
1. Forthwith rescind, as to Council 82 unit employees, its January 8, 1997 memorandum relating 
to time off for scheduled appointments with health care providers. 
) 2. Forthwith restore the practice as it existed prior to January 8,1997 with respect to time 
off for scheduled appointments with health care providers for Council 82 unit 
employees. 
3. Forthwith make all unit employees whole for any wages and benefits lost as a result 
of the January 8, 1997 memorandum. 
Dated By . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
State of New York (Department of Correctional 
Services - Downstate Correctional Facility) 
~Ws Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
,)y any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CORRECTION OFFICER BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
OF ROCKLAND COUNTY, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-17366 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND AND ROCKLAND COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Respondent. 
GOODSTEIN AND WEST (NANCY ZECCA of counsel) and SUSSMAN, 
BERGSTEIN, WOTORSON & WHATELEY (STEPHEN BERGSTEIN of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
JOSEPH E. SUAREZ, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Rockland and the 
Rockland County Sheriff (County) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
on a charge filed by the Correction Officer Benevolent Association of Rockland County 
(Association). The ALJ read the Association's charge, as amended, to allege that the 
County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it failed to negotiate the impact of a decision to double-cell inmates at the County's jail 
and unilaterally increased the workload of unit employees. After a hearing, the ALJ 
held that the County violated the Act on both impact and unilateral change allegations. 
The County argues the following in its exceptions: that the subject of the charge 
is staffing, a nonmandatory subject of negotiation; that workload increases and safety 
\ Board - U-17366 -2 
hazards were either nonexistent, not proven, or de minimus; that the ALJ's decision 
was the product of a pervasive bias against the County; that the decision contains 
certain mistakes and misrepresentations of fact; and that the County's timeliness 
defense was not given adequate attention. The Association has not filed any 
exceptions or_a responseJoJheXounty's exceptions. _.__. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the exceptions, we affirm the ALJ's 
decision as to the violation premised on the County's failure to negotiate the impact of 
its decision to double-cell inmates, but reverse as to the violation found upon a 
unilateral change in workload. We reverse the latter aspect of the ALJ's decision 
because the charge did not include any allegation of violation grounded upon a 
N unilateral change in workload. Therefore, we do not address the merits of the ALJ's 
holding as to the negotiability of decisions about employee workload. 
We have held repeatedly and recently1 that we will not find a violation of the Act 
upon an allegation which has not been pleaded, even if that allegation has been 
litigated. No matter how broadly this charge is read in favor of the Association, it is not 
reasonably susceptible to a conclusion that the Association based any claim of 
impropriety on a unilateral change in employee workload. The charge as filed, 
amended, explained during the hearing and briefed thereafter is consistent with, at 
most, only two allegations of impropriety: first, an allegation that the County failed or 
refused to negotiate upon demand the safety and workload effects of its decision to 
double-cell inmates; second, an allegation that the decision to double-cell was itself 
) 
1/Vew York City Transit Auth., 31 PERB 1J3024 (1998). 
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mandatorily negotiable because of the effects that decision had upon unit employees' 
safety and workload. 
During his opening statement, the Association's counsel stated repeatedly that 
the charge, as amended, concerned only the effects of the double-celling on the unit 
..employees' jsafetyand workload. AfterAummarMng.thps_e_safety.and. workload 
concerns, the Association's counsel stated: "We're addressing the effects [double-
celling] has on officers." After the County's attorney gave his opening statement, and in 
response to the ALJ's request for clarification of the charge, the Association's counsel 
stated, "[0]ur position is that management had an obligation to negotiate the impact 
double celling would have." In response to a specific question from the ALJ as to 
whether the charge was limited to a failure to negotiate the impact of the decision to 
double-cell inmates, the Association's counsel stated: "This charge concerns the failure 
to negotiate the impact of the decision to double cell." Thereafter, the Association's 
counsel indicated to the ALJ that the decision to double-cell was perhaps itself subject 
to a duty to negotiate prior to the implementation of that decision "as it had an effect on 
job conditions." 
The Association's statements at the hearing as to the limited scope of its charge 
were reinforced by its post-hearing memorandum. The County's failure to negotiate the 
impact of double-celling and the County's duty to negotiate that decision were the only 
allegations briefed by the Association. 
Further persuasive evidence that the charge did not allege a unilateral change in 
workload as a violation of the Act lies in the safety allegations contained within the 
charge and the ALJ's treatment of those safety allegations. The unit employees' stated 
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concerns with the safety effects of the decision to double-cell were at least equal to, if 
not greater than, the articulated workload concerns. Indeed, it was the safety concerns 
which were detailed in the charge as originally filed, not the workload concerns, which 
were not specifically identified until the charge was amended. The safety allegations in 
.the_charga.are_.at least as numerous and specific as_the_w_or_kload_concerns,_-yetthe_ALJ 
did not read the charge as one incorporating an alleged unilateral change in safety. 
The ALJ treated the safety allegations correctly "as part of the Association's claim that 
the [County] failed to negotiate impact." No exceptions were taken to the ALJ's 
disposition of the safety allegations. Just as the safety allegations were treated, the 
workload allegations should have been considered under this charge only as a part of 
the County's alleged failure or refusal to negotiate the impact of the decision to double-
cell. 
The workload allegations were in the charge for several reasons. They were part 
of the effects of the decision to double-cell, effects which the County allegedly failed to 
negotiate pursuant to the Association's demand. Those same allegations also 
supported the Association's request for injunctive relief. The workload allegations were 
also recited in conjunction with the alleged negotiability of the decision to double-cell. 
But those workload allegations were never presented as a separate improper practice 
resting on a unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment. 
The ALJ's conclusion that the County failed to negotiate pursuant to the 
Association's demand the safety, workload and other mandatorily negotiable effects of 
its decision to double-cell inmates is unassailable under this record upon any ground 
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stated in the exceptions. The ALJ's decision in this regard is affirmed without further 
comment.2 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision that the County violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act by a unilateral increase of unit employees' workload is reversed 
andjhe!.remedial order issued_pursuanttheretojs rescinded. The„.decision_is.otherwise 
affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Negotiate the impact of double-celling on unit employees' terms and 
conditions of employment. 
2. Post notice in the form attached at all locations ordinarily used to post 
notices of information to employees in the unit represented by the 
Association. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
larc A. Abbott, Member 
2Our affirmance does not mean that there are, in fact, safety hazards or workload 
increases caused by the double-celling or what those exact effects are, to the extent 
they exist at all. The ALJ held, and we hold, only that the Association was entitled 
pursuant to its demand to negotiate to more than the informal, off-the-record 
conversations which were held with the Sheriff. 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff (County) in the 
unit represented by the Correction Officer Benevolent Association of Rockland County that the County 
will negotiate the impact on unit employees' terms and conditions of employment of double-celling of 
inmates incarcerated at the County jail. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
County of Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
— - - - —Petitioner, - -
- and - CASE NO. CP-503 
OGDENSBURG CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARRETT & REITZ, P.C. (MARC H. 
REITZ of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Ogdensburg City School 
District (District) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) on the unit placement aspect of a petition filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
On a stipulated record, the Director placed approximately fifty noninstructional 
part-time employees who are regularly scheduled to work less than twenty hours per 
week into CSEA's existing unit. That unit includes approximately 120 full-time and part-
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i 
time noninstructional employees who are regularly scheduled to work twenty hours or 
more per week. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the at-issue part-time employees are 
most appropriately placed in a separate unit because they do not have a strong 
communityofJnterestwith the employeesjnihe existing..unit,_p.rimarily...b_acaus.e.th.ey_do_.._ 
not enjoy any of the fringe benefits or job protections afforded the noninstructional 
employees who are currently represented. CSEA argues in response that the Director's 
decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record, we dismiss the petition without reaching the uniting 
question decided by the Director. A unit placement petition may not be used in the 
_ circumstances of this case because a question as to CSEA's continuing majority status 
is raised by the petition. 
Our unit placement rules are intended to permit relatively minor adjustments to 
the composition of an existing negotiating unit. That intent was manifest when the rule 
applied only to newly created or substantially altered positions. Although the rule has 
been amended to open the unit placement process to "a position", without qualification 
by type, the intent was only to allow for the placement into the appropriate unit of 
established, unchanged positions which had been excluded historically from 
representation. The rule change was not intended to make a unit placement petition a 
substitute for a certification/decertification proceeding, which is the only appropriate 
mechanism for the resolution of questions concerning a union's majority support. When 
majority status questions are presented, the policies of the Act mandate that the 
representation questions be channeled for decision under a petition for certification/ 
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decertification. Only the rules applicable to the filing and processing of a petition for 
certification/decertification, which incorporate fixed filing periods and showing of interest 
requirements, protect the multiple interests at stake when a question as to an 
incumbent union's continuing majority status is raised. 
__ Although our unit placement rules cannot be use 
sought to be added to a unit is large enough to put the incumbent union's majority 
status reasonably in dispute, we do not have any decisions at any level as to when a 
majority status question is raised for purposes of a unit placement petition.1 For 
purposes of a unit placement petition, we hold that a majority status question is 
presented if the number of employees proposed to be added to a unit is thirty percent 
or more of the number of employees in the existing unit. This numbers' comparison 
gives, we believe, the fairest indication as to whether an incumbent union's majority 
status has been placed in issue and the one which is best suited to the limited purposes 
of a unit placement petition. 
CSEA would add at least fifty employees to an existing unit of 120, an increase 
of approximately forty-two percent. The number of employees to be added under this 
petition to CSEA's existing unit being more than thirty percent of the number of 
employees in the existing noninstructional unit, the unit placement petition must be 
dismissed in favor of a timely filed, adequately supported petition for certification/ 
decertification. 
1ln different context and for other purposes, it has been suggested that a majority 
status question is presented if the number of employees to be added to a unit is equal 
to or greater than thirty percent of the unit found to be appropriate. See New York 
Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 27 PERB fi3034 (1994). 
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For the reasons set forth above, the petition must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MERSUDA GUICHARD, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - - - CASE NO. U-18935 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 100, 
Respondent, 
- and -
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
) MERSUDA GUICHARD, pro se 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTEIN & ROSEN (HOWARD WIEN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, ACTING VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL 
COUNSEL (DANIEL TOPPER of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Mersuda Guichard to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing her improper practice charge against the 
Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU).1 Guichard alleges that the TWU violated 
1Pursuant to §204.2 of the Rules of Procedure, the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) declined to process the charge as 
deficient as to the allegations against Guichard's employer, the New York City Transit 
Authority (Authority). His determination was confirmed by the ALJ. No exceptions have 
) been filed regarding this aspect of the ALJ's decision. The Authority is a statutory party 
to the case pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
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§209-a.2 (c) of the Act when it refused to introduce into evidence at her disciplinary 
arbitration hearing a revised physician's certification of illness in support of her 
disciplinary grievance. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge on two grounds. Crediting the testimony of 
TWU's witnesses, she found that Guichard had not presented the document in question 
to the TWU representatives at or before the disciplinary arbitration. The ALJ further 
found that even if Guichard had proffered the doctor's certificate to the TWU's 
representatives at the arbitration, the record did not establish that TWU's position at the 
disciplinary arbitration was taken in bad faith, or was arbitrary or grossly negligent. 
Guichard excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that she is a diabetic and that 
her use of sick leave should be governed by the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)2 
and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)3. She asserts that TWU breached its 
duty of fair representation by failing to invoke the ADA and the FMLA, which should 
take precedence over any provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between 
TWU and the Authority. TWU supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Guichard is employed by the Authority as a railroad clerk. She reported that she 
became ill while on duty on July 27, 1996 and went home. She was then absent from 
work on July 30 and 31, and August 1, 1996. She returned to work on August 2, 1996. 
242 U.S.C. §12101 etseq. (1990). 
329 U.S.C. §2601 etseq. (1993). 
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Pursuant to the Authority-TWU collective bargaining agreement,4 within the requisite 
time period, she submitted medical proof of illness for a paid leave of absence from 
work on July 27, 30 and 31 and August 1, 1996. On August 27, 1996, Guichard was 
served with a notice of discipline charging her with failure to provide medical 
documentation certifying her inability to perform her duties on all four days of her 
absence and seeking her discharge.5 Guichard filed a disciplinary grievance and was 
represented by TWU at both the Step I and Step II hearings. The notice of discipline 
was sustained at both levels so Guichard appealed to the Authority-TWU Tripartite 
Arbitration Board. 
At the arbitration, Guichard was represented by John Borrero, a TWU 
representative, and Edmond Pendleton, a TWU attorney. Guichard asserts that she 
gave them a revised medical certification6 at the arbitration but that they refused to 
4Section 2.6, paragraph I of the Authority-TWU contract, in relevant part, 
provides: 
The burden of establishing that he/she was actually unfit for 
work on account of illnes shall be upon the employee. Every 
application for sick leave, whether with or without pay, for 
more than two days, must be accompanied by medical proof 
satisfactory to the Transit Authority and upon a form 
furnished by the Transit Authority, setting forth the nature of 
the employee's illness and certifying that by reason of such 
illness the employee was unable to perform his/her duties for 
the period of the absence. 
5The leave form submitted by Guichard was signed by a physician from her 
regular physician's office and certified her inability to work only on August 1 and 2, 
1996. On the bottom was a handwritten note stating: "Above named patient states that 
she has not been feeling well on the following dates 7/27 - 7/28, 7/29, 7/30, 7/31, 8/1 
and could not come to work." 
6The leave form was signed by Guichard's regular physician on December 2, 
1996. It certified that she had been unable to work for the period July 27, 1996 to 
August 1, 1996. 
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introduce it into evidence at the hearing. Both Borrero and Pendleton, according to the 
ALJ, credibly testified that Guichard did not give them the revised form and that, in fact, 
Pendleton asked her when the arbitration began if she wanted an adjournment to try to 
obtain an acceptable medical certification. The ALJ credited Borrero and Pendleton 
and the record fully supports her credibility resolution. Guichard could not remember 
what Pendleton told her at the arbitration about his reasons for keeping the revised 
medical certification out of evidence, she had mistakenly identified Borrero as her 
Step II representative, and the revised medical certification she introduced at the 
hearing before the ALJ, although signed by Guichard's physician in December 1996, 
was not signed by Guichard's supervisor until February 1997. As Guichard failed upon 
the credibility resolution made by the ALJ to establish that she presented the revised 
medical certification to Borrero and Pendleton at the arbitration, her charge alleging that 
they improperly refused to introduce it into evidence must be dismissed. 
Guichard's arguments that she is covered by the provisions of the ADA and the 
FMLA and that they supersede the provisions of the Authority-TWU collective 
bargaining agreement are not properly before us.7 In addition, her assertions that the 
TWU was negligent or acted in bad faith by negotiating contractual provisions that differ 
from the provisions of the ADA and the FMLA and by failing to invoke the provisions of 
the ADA and the FMLA in prosecuting her grievance were raised for the first time in the 
exceptions and we will not, therefore, address them.8 
7BalIston Spa Cent. Sch. Dist, 25 PERB fl3084 (1992). 
8Smithtown Fire Dist, 28 PERB P060 (1995). 
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Based on the foregoing, Guichard's exceptions are denied and the decision of 
the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
; A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Nassau Community College 
(College) and the County of Nassau (County) to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on a petition for unit 
, Board - CP-432 -2 
clarification/placement (UC/UP). The College/County filed this UC/UP petition for a 
determination as to whether the "position" of "mini-semester instructor" is in or should 
be placed into either the unit of adjunct faculty represented by the Adjunct Faculty 
Association (AFA) or the unit of full-time faculty represented by the Nassau Community 
College Federation of Teachers (Federation). .._... _ 
The Director declined to process the petition for two reasons. He held that the 
UC/UP processes are inapplicable because there is no "position" of mini-semester 
instructor, only assignments to teach. He also held that processing the petition would 
not be consistent with the policies of the Act because arbitration awards, as judicially 
confirmed, would be thereby undermined. Those arbitration awards, which are mutually 
inconsistent, have awarded the work of teaching during the mini-semester exclusively to 
both the adjunct faculty and the full-time faculty. 
The College/County argue that the Director erred in not processing the petition 
because there is a "position" within the meaning of §201.2(b) of our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules). Moreover, they argue that the policies of the Act calling for PERB to assist 
parties in resolving disputes without service disruption1 demand that we process this 
petition. The Federation also urges that we process this petition. The AFA argues that 
the Director was correct in not processing the petition for the reasons stated in his 
decision. Accordingly, the AFA asks us to dismiss the exceptions and affirm the 
Director's decision. 
1The mini-semester program has been canceled until such time as the dispute 
presented is somewhere or somehow resolved. 
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Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, including 
those at oral argument, we affirm the Director's decision on the first of his stated 
reasons. 
The UC/UP rules have always pertained to a "position" without, however, 
_de.fin.ing that word..J".he.Director determined Jhatthe "positionlto.whichihe_UC/UP 
rules apply is a job title, not a work assignment, and we agree with the Director's 
interpretation. 
There is no circumstance in which the UC/UP rules have been applied to a work 
assignment dispute. Although a dictionary definition of the word "position" might be 
broad enough to capture a work assignment of the type at issue in this proceeding, our 
UC/UP rules were simply never intended to be read that expansively. We intended 
) 
"position" for purposes of §201.2(b) of our Rules to refer to that for which there exists a 
title with a duties description and a specification of qualifications as generally required, 
for example, for positions under the Civil Service Law. 
It is only a "position" as defined in this sense which can be subject to a uniting 
determination. The negotiating units we have established are most often defined 
specifically by reference to job title. We have accepted stipulated units defined more 
generally by types of employment, e.g., all blue-collar employees, but even then, our 
operative assumption is that the unit description corresponds to job titles. Uniting by 
work assignment only, devoid of underlying positions, would not be done. What is 
inappropriate in defining the unit in the first instance cannot become appropriate 
pursuant to a request made later to clarify or adjust the composition of that unit. 
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In this case, there is admittedly no title of "mini-semester instructor". There is 
only an opportunity for persons who are already employed in other job titles and 
represented in either the Federation's or AFA's unit to teach for a short period of time 
between semesters. There being no title of mini-semester instructor, the indicia of a 
."poMionladyanced by th 
This case does not involve the uniting of a "position", instead, a dispute as to 
whether employees in one or the other or both of the existing faculty units should be 
assigned to teach during the mini-semester. Resolution of this work assignment 
dispute simply lies beyond our power under existing law and rules.3 
Our inability to process this petition is not an indication of a disinterest in the 
dilemma confronting those who would like to see the mini-semester program continue, 
which we take to include all of the parties to this proceeding. We would expect that a 
good faith pursuit of common interests would yield a satisfactory compromise ensuring 
a continuation of educational opportunity. 
We do not process this petition only because we cannot. There is no "position" 
within the meaning of §201.2(b) of our Rules as to which a uniting determination can be 
made, whether clarification or placement. Whether the arbitration awards would 
provide a policy reason for not processing a petition if there were a position of mini-
2lt is argued, for example, that mini-semester work is separate from the work 
regularly done by either the full-time or adjunct faculty and recognized by the 
employees in both of those units to be separate from their regular work. 
3Compare the power of the National Labor Relations Board over work 
assignment disputes under §§8(b)(4)(D) & 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act as 
amended in 1947. 
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semester instructor is an issue we need not decide given the basis for our dismissal of 
this petition. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
...- IT-IS,_T-HEREF-ORE, ORDEREDthat thepetition must iie,-ancLit herebyis, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
) 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
^Marc A. Abbott, Member 
y 
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In the Matter of 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Nassau (Police 
Department) (County) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge 
filed against the County by the Police Benevolent Association of the Police Department 
of the County of Nassau (PBA). As relevant to the exceptions, the ALJ held that the 
County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it did not respond to the PBA's demand to negotiate the safety effects caused by the 
County's decision to reduce the staffing levels on marine patrol boats.1 
'The ALJ dismissed an allegation that the County's unilateral reduction in crew 
size separately violated the Act. No exceptions were taken to that part of the ALJ's 
decision. 
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The County excepts to the ALJ's-characterization of the at-issue boats as "long" 
or "small" as inaccurate, her finding that staffing levels were "changed" as unsupported 
by the record or one resting on evidence which should not have been received, and to 
parts of the decision which it argues are internally inconsistent. The County's main 
contentions, however, are that the PBA's demand was overboard and too vague to 
trigger any impact bargaining obligation, that the ALJ erred in concluding that a 
waiver/zipper clause in the parties' agreement was inapplicable because it had 
sunsetted, and erred also in holding that the staffing level agreement in §9.23-7 of the 
parties' contract did not waive any safety impact bargaining rights the PBA might have 
had regarding any unilateral change in crew size. 
The PBA in its response denies the County's enumerated exceptions and argues 
that the ALJ's decision is correct as a matter of fact and law. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we reverse 
the ALJ's decision because the staffing level agreement satisfies the County's 
obligation to negotiate the safety impact or effects of reductions in crew size made to a 
level consistent with the parties' agreement. 
We take the opportunity at the outset of our decision to clarify the nature of a 
defense grounded upon a claim that the subject(s) sought to be bargained pursuant to 
a charging party's demand have already been negotiated to completion. This Board's 
decisions have sometimes characterized this defense as duty satisfaction, sometimes 
waiver by agreement, and sometimes simultaneously both duty satisfaction and waiver. 
Although the second and third characterizations cannot be considered wholly 
Board - U-17985 -3 
inaccurate, we believe that the first most accurately describes the true nature of this 
particular defense. 
Waiver concepts suggest that a charging party has surrendered something.2 
Although waiver may accurately describe a loss of right, such as one relinquished by 
sjjejice, i nac t ^ thei defense as; described is;_npt.one_. 
under which a respondent is claiming that the charging party has suffered or should be 
made to suffer a loss of right. Under this particular defense, a respondent is claiming 
affirmatively that it and the charging party have already negotiated the subject(s) at 
issue and have reached an agreement as to how the subject(s) is to be treated, at least 
for the duration of the parties' agreement. By expressing this particular defense as duty 
satisfaction, we give a better recognition to the factual circumstances actually giving 
rise to it and expect to avoid the confusion and imprecision in analysis which have 
sometimes been caused by the other noted characterizations of this defense. 
Section 9.23-7 of the parties' agreement provides as follows: 
There shall be a minimum of two (2) employees in the Marine 
Bureau assigned to the operation of all boats during the hours of 
darkness or in the operation of boats in excess of 20 feet in 
length . . . or three (3) employees in the operation of boats in 
excess of 40 feet in length. 
The ALJ found the County changed staffing from three employees to two on boats thirty 
feet or longer in length, when only one such boat was deployed on the day tour. That 
'
2Waiver has been defined, for example, as the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n. v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 1J7011 
(3d Dep't 1982) (subsequent history omitted). 
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change was to a level consistent with the parties' agreement because three employees 
are required under the parties' agreement only on boats in excess of forty feet in length. 
The PBA has a right under the Act to negotiate, pursuant to its impact demand, 
only the mandatorily negotiable effects of the County's decision to reduce staffing to 
contractual leye^ 
negotiation. Like all bargaining obligations, however, an employer's duty to negotiate 
the mandatorily negotiable effects of its managerial decisions can be satisfied. 
Although recognizing the principles stated above, the ALJ read the Board's 
decision in International Association of Firefighters of the City of Newburgh, Local 5893 
(hereafter Newburgh) to reveal a caution against exempting an employer from its duty 
to negotiate safety issues under a broadly worded impact demand. The ALJ's reading 
of Newburgh is a good illustration of the confusion which can be caused by analyzing a 
duty satisfaction defense as a waiver of bargaining rights. The County is not being 
exempted from its duty to negotiate safety impact nor has the PBA lost its bargaining 
rights in that regard. The County has recognized its duty and has satisfied it during 
negotiations which culminated with §9.23-7 of the parties' agreement. The caution 
noted in Newburgh simply has no application in circumstances in which a party's 
bargaining obligation has been satisfied. 
The PBA agreed that the County could fix the crew size on boats within limits 
and upon conditions. The County acted in accordance with that contract. No safety 
impact bargaining demand, no matter how broadly that demand was worded, could 
) 
310PERBH3001 (1977) 
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expose the County to a safety impact bargaining obligation because the full range of 
safety issues, whether general or specific, were inherently and inextricably entwined as 
a matter of law with the staffing level decisions the County implemented. The PBA and 
the County necessarily settled all safety impact issues flowing from a contractually 
authorized change jncreW-Size upon thelotality.ofth 
and otherwise, contained within the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The PBA 
effectively agreed that whatever safety concerns it had regarding staffing 
determinations were satisfied, given all other considerations in the contract, with boat 
crews of certain sizes as fixed by length of boat and operating conditions. To the extent 
the County changed the crew size, it was to a level authorized by contract. In that 
circumstance, there could not be any safety issues that had not already been 
addressed, albeit nonspecifically, during the negotiations leading up to §9.23-7. In this 
latter regard, there is a suggestion in the ALJ's decision that a safety impact bargaining 
obligation could be fully satisfied only if the parties' agreement specifically addressed 
safety issues, e.g., a general safety clause or some safety procedures or standards. 
We do not agree with that proposition. As with any issue, safety issues can be settled 
upon an exchange of other promises even if they are not directly related to safety. 
The PBA is not by this decision, of course, permanently deprived of the right to 
negotiate safety issues raised by changes in staffing levels or otherwise. We hold only 
that those safety issues were not negotiable pursuant to an impact bargaining demand 
arising from the County's exercise of its contractual staffing rights. 
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Having concluded that §9.23-7 satisfied the County's duty to negotiate safety 
impact issues arising from changes in staffing levels permitted by agreement, we do not 
consider any of the parties' other arguments. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is reversed. 
...IT IS,.THEREFORE, ORDERED jhat;the_chajge mu.^.b^andJLbereby_LS, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Plainedge Union Free School 
District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper 
practice charge filed by the Plainedge Federation of Teachers (Federation).1 The ALJ 
determined that the District had violated §209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it placed a disciplinary memorandum into the 
1This charge was consolidated for hearing and decision with Case No. U-17595, 
another improper practice charge filed by the Federation against the District. No 
exceptions to the ALJ's decision dismissing that charge have been filed. Plainedge 
Union Free Sch. Dist, 31 PERB 1J4538 (1997). 
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personnel file of Vita Bottitta-lsaacs, a Federation officer, for her having engaged in 
protected activities. 
The ALJ found that Bottitta-lsaacs had made remarks about teacher solidarity, in 
which she also questioned the administration at an end-of-the-year breakfast for faculty 
and administrators at the.District's high, school, and thatjhe District jssued a 
memorandum to her correcting the "inaccuracies" in her statement and placed the 
memorandum in Bottitta-lsaacs' personnel file. Bottitta-lsaacs grieved the disciplinary 
memorandum, which an arbitrator found to be inaccurate and ordered removed from 
her file. The District thereafter removed that memorandum from Bottitta-lsaacs' 
personnel file. Finding that the District had violated the Act, the ALJ ordered the District 
to remove the memorandum from Bottitta-lsaacs' file, to not retaliate against her for the 
exercise of protected rights and to posta notice. 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in failing to 
dismiss the charge as moot, in finding that the District was improperly motivated, and in 
ordering that a notice be posted. The Federation filed cross-exceptions, arguing that 
the remedial order should cover retaliation against any unit employees, but in all other 
respects, supporting the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the file and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, but modify the remedy. 
Bottitta-lsaacs has been employed by the District for over thirty years as a 
Library Media Specialist. She also served as president of the Federation from 1978 to 
1984, and as vice president, grievance chair and head negotiator from 1984 to 1994. 
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Labor relations in the District were characterized by the parties as harmonious until 
1994, when the District began experiencing budget difficulties. The record shows that 
during the 1994-1995 school year, the Federation filed many more grievances and 
improper practice charges than it had in prior years and the relationship between the 
Federation and the.Djstrict. b_ecame_ strained. Bottjtta-1saacs was Involved in these 
actions. 
At the hearing, the ALJ correctly accepted into evidence the arbitrator's decision 
and advised the parties that she was deferring to the factual findings of the arbitrator.2 
The record shows that at the end of the 1994-1995 school year, Bottitta-lsaacs was 
reassigned from the high school to a split assignment between two elementary schools. 
On the last day of school, an informal breakfast, which was an annual event, was held 
for staff at the high school. Teachers who would no longer be working at the high 
school were the recipients of gifts. When Bottitta-lsaacs accepted her gift, she was 
greeted with a standing ovation from the teachers and, thereafter, made some remarks 
to those assembled. She spoke about teacher unity, teachers speaking up when they 
saw something improper, teachers standing up for a fellow teacher who was not being 
treated properly, and urged them to question the administration because she would no 
longer be there to do it for them. Several administrators who were present heard a 
different message, one which they interpreted as being a call for teachers to disregard 
or disobey administrators. 
2State of New York (Ben Aaman), 11 PERB 1J3084 (1978); New York City Transit 
Auth. (Bordansky), 4 PERB |[3031 (1971). 
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On September 6, 1995, Bottitta-lsaacs received a memorandum from the high 
school principal, Jeffrey Hollman, which stated: 
At the final breakfast on Friday, June 23, 1995 you made certain 
comments to the high school teaching staff which were inaccurate, 
and I am writing this letter as a form of caution and guidance in this 
matter. You told teachers they should not listen to what 
administrators tell .them:.tp_dg....._ _ _.„ 
The district holds that it is the duty and obligation of teachers to 
cooperate with supervisory and administrative staff. Failure to 
cooperate would constitute inappropriate behavior. If a teacher 
feels an administrator has asked a teacher to do something that 
violates the contract or appears to be improper, there are 
appropriate channels for that teacher to follow to settle the matter. 
I am writing this memo, therefore, to inform you that it was 
inaccurate information that you delivered to teachers when you 
said the above. 
I think it is incumbent upon you to give proper advice to teachers 
) and make them aware that it would be inappropriate not to 
cooperate with supervisory and administrative staff. I trust you will 
do so at the first opportunity. 
A copy of the memorandum was placed in Bottitta-lsaacs' personnel file. 
Pursuant to Article IV, section 1 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, 
Bottitta-lsaacs filed a grievance seeking to have the memorandum removed from her 
file.3 The grievance went to advisory arbitration and, by a decision dated March 13, 
3Article IV, section 1, in relevant part, provides: 
Communications concerning teacher conduct and 
performance, other than evaluative materials prepared 
according to district policy, shall not be filed in the folder 
prior to the conclusion of a waiting period often (10) school 
days, such waiting period to provide the teacher an 
opportunity to initiate a grievance Any material judged 
inaccurate or incorrect as the result of the grievance 
procedure shall not be placed in the folder. 
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1997, an arbitrator found that Hollman's memorandum constituted incorrect information 
and ordered it removed from Bottitta-lsaac's personnel file. The District complied and 
removed the memorandum from Bottitta-lsaacs' personnel file.4 
The District argues that there is no evidence of improper motivation on Hollman's 
partand that, therefore, the ALJ erred in finding a._yjpjajjon of .§2Q9-a^(a).and.Xc)_ofJhe 
Act. The District, in this respect, misconstrues the elements of proof necessary in 
establishing a charge of interference and discrimination. In Town of Independence,5 we 
reiterated the required standard of proof in a case involving a claimed violation of 
§209-a.1(a)or(c): 
It is well settled that the elements necessary to prove a case of 
discrimination for union activity under the Act are that the affected 
individual was engaged in protected activity, that such activity was 
) known to the person(s) making the adverse employment decision, 
and that the action would not have taken place but for the 
protected activity. 
, Union animus or other motive improper under the Act is not an indispensable element 
of an interference or discrimination violation.6 
Here, the ALJ adopted the factual findings of the arbitrator that Bottitta-lsaac's 
statements were clearly intended to be a call for unification of the teachers and a plea 
that they continue to engage in mutual support. That her statements are of the type 
4The instant improper practice charge was filed on January 2, 1996. 
523 PERB 1J3020, at 3038 (1990). 
6State of New York, 25 PERB 1J3050 (1992). 
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protected by the Act is not in dispute.7 Neither can there be any argument that Hollman 
heard the remarks. Additionally, he received a call from the Superintendent of Schools 
within an hour of the breakfast. He subsequently received memoranda from several 
administrators who were present at the breakfast about what they felt was the 
inappropriate .andjnsjubcTd^ 
would not have issued the memorandum "but for" Bottitta-lsaac's remarks at the 
breakfast meeting. On that basis, the charge must be sustained because there was an 
action taken by the District that was admittedly a response to Bottitta-lsaacs' remarks to 
the employees, an exercise of protected rights.8 
The District argues that the ALJ erred in refusing to dismiss the charge as moot 
because it removed Hollman's memorandum from Bottitta-lsaacs' personnel file upon 
receipt of the arbitrator's award. The District's withdrawal of the memorandum does not 
render moot the District's violation of Bottitta-lsaacs rights under the Act, although it 
does affect the remedy.9 
The ALJ ordered Hollman's memorandum removed from Bottitta-lsaacs' 
personnel file. As the record establishes that the memorandum had already been 
7New York City Transit Auth. (Alston), 20 PERB H3065 (1987); Plainedge Public 
Sen., 13 PERB H3037(1980). 
aUniondale Union Free Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 167A.D.2d 475, 23 PERB 1J7022 (2d 
Dep't 1990), conf'g 21 PERB H3044 (1988); City of Salamanca, 18 PERB ^3012 (1985). 
9Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 215 A.D.2d 669, 28 PERB 1J7007 (2d 
Dep't 1995); Town of Huntington, 27 PERB 1J3039 (1994); Onondaga-Cortland-Madison 
BOCES v. PERB, 198 A.D.2d 824, 26 PERB 1J7015 (4th Dep't 1993); New York City 
Transit Auth. (Alston), supra note 7. 
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removed at the time of the hearing, the District's exception that the remedy needs 
modification to reflect that fact should be granted. 
Finally, the Federation argues that the remedy ordered by the ALJ that the 
District not retaliate against Bottitta-lsaacs for the exercise of protected rights is too 
narroyy andI should ..instead, coyer .aj]_unit employees,. Aswas.decided in County_of__ ._ 
Orleans10 (hereafter Orleans), when presented with a similar argument that a cease and 
desist order directed only to the employee affected by the employer's discriminatory 
conduct be broadened to cover all unit employees: 
Section 213 of the Act provides a procedure for the judicial review 
and enforcement of PERB's final orders. This enforcement 
mechanism and the respondent's right to be held accountable only 
for those violations charged necessitate that our orders be limited 
to the facts reflected in the record, be stated with as much 
specificity as is reasonably possible, and be tailored to meet the 
particular circumstances of the proceeding. A broad cease and 
desist order raises difficulties in subsequent enforcement 
proceedings involving facts unlike and unrelated to those originally 
charged. In an enforcement proceeding brought under a broad 
cease and desist order, the court could assume the role of finder of 
fact, becoming a labor tribunal of first instance, forced to make the 
very factual determinations which §205.5(d) of the Act expressly 
vests in PERB. 
Accordingly, we dismiss the Federation's cross-exception which is directed to the scope 
of the ALJ's order. Indeed, the ALJ's order is too broad under Orleans and we have 
modified the order accordingly. 
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the District's exceptions, except as to 
modification of the remedy ordered by the ALJ, and we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
1025 PERB 1J3010, at 3028 (1992). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: ' 
1. Cease and desist from disciplining Vita Bottitta-lsaacs for remarks she 
made at a high school breakfast on June 23, 1995, and 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations ordinarily used to 
......post informational notices..to.unit employees. ... .... _. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
7 "Marc A. Abbott, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES" FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Plainedge Union Free School District that it will not discipline Vita Bottitta-
Isaacs for remarks she made at a high school breakfast on June 23,1995. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
PLAINEDGE FEDERATION OF TEACHERS 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTH TARRYTOWN POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19257 
VILLAGE OF SLEEPY HOLLOW, 
Respondent. 
KENNETH J. FRANZBLAU, ESQ., for Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (CRAIG L. OLIVO of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the North Tarrytown Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
on its charge against the Village of Sleepy Hollow (Village). The Association alleges in 
its charge that the Village violated §209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when the Village submitted a salary proposal lower than any it 
made during negotiations in its response to the PBA's petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration.1 
1The Village proposed in its response a two-year freeze on salary. During 
) negotiations, the Village proposed a one-year freeze followed by a salary increase of 
2.5% for the second year. The Village alleges in its answer that changed economic 
conditions caused it to alter its salary proposal at arbitration. 
Board - U-19257 -2 
The ALJ dismissed the charge as untimely filed. Concluding that the charge 
raised an objection to arbitrability, the ALJ held that the timeliness of the PBA's charge 
was governed by §205.6(b) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). That section of the 
Rules requires charges raising objections to arbitrability be filed by the party seeking 
interest arbitratLon within 
petition for arbitration. The PBA received the Village's arbitration response on May 14, 
1997. This charge was filed more than three months later, on August 18, 1997. 
The PBA argues that the ALJ's decision should be reversed because it is 
inconsistent with a "ruling" made earlier by another ALJ in a letter sent to different 
parties in another improper practice proceeding.2 
The Village argues that the ALJ's decision in this case is correct and that a 
statement by another ALJ in a different proceeding should not be considered a ruling 
binding in this proceeding. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of this 
charge as untimely filed. 
There are two issues on this appeal. First, whether the ALJ correctly held that 
the PBA's charge raises an objection to arbitrability which had to have been filed within 
ten working days after the PBA's receipt of the Village's response. On that issue, we 
affirm the ALJ's decision. The allegations in this charge fall literally within the language 
of .the Rules that lists the submission to arbitration of matters not previously negotiated 
2The other charge was docketed as Case No. U-18094 and involved the Town of 
Ossining Police Association, Inc., which was represented by the same attorney as 
represents the PBA in this case, and the Town of Ossining. 
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as an objection to arbitrability.3 The two-year wage freeze proposed by the Village at 
arbitration was not the subject of the parties' negotiations. Moreover, the allegation in 
this charge should be treated as an objection to arbitrability for the policy reasons 
stated in the ALJ's decision. 
The second issue actually:..ppses two questions. We are asked to decide 
whether the ALJ's statement in the Town of Ossining proceeding is inconsistent with 
the ALJ's decision in this case, and, if so, the effect of that inconsistency. 
In the proceeding involving the Town of Ossining,4 the union alleged that the 
employer had submitted to arbitration matters that had not been previously negotiated. 
The union then tried to amend that charge to include an allegation that the employer 
had omitted a salary proposal in its response to the petition for arbitration despite the 
employer's having made a salary proposal during negotiations and mediation. The ALJ 
assigned to the Town of Ossining proceeding wrote a letter to the parties declining to 
accept the amendment because the "allegation raised in the attempted amendment. . . 
does not raise issues of arbitrability". A second improper practice charge was then filed 
by the union to incorporate the allegation it had sought to raise by the amendment. The 
charges in the Town of Ossining proceeding were withdrawn before any decision 
issued. 
The allegation sought to be raised by the amendment to the charge in the 
proceeding involving the Town of Ossining is not comparable to the allegation in this 
3Rules §205.6(a)(2). 
4We have taken notice of the documents in that case file, the content of which is 
not in dispute. 
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charge. There is a difference between a response to a petition for arbitration which is 
silent upon a given issue, as in the Town of Ossining proceeding, and one which 
affirmatively contains a proposal on an issue materially different from the offers which 
had actually been made on that issue prior to arbitration, as is the circumstance here. 
.Arguably,Jhe first may not be an o b ^ 
clearly is. 
We do not consider it appropriate, however, to end our analysis of this second 
issue on what might be characterized by some as an overly fine distinction. 
Even if the circumstances in the Town of Ossining proceeding and this 
proceeding were precisely the same, an ALJ's statement or ruling or order in one case 
is not binding upon another ALJ in a different proceeding, and certainly never binding 
upon this Board. For example, if the ALJ had accepted the PBA's arguments, and had 
held in this case that the timeliness of the PBA's charge was to be assessed under the 
generally applicable four-month period of limitations under §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules, 
we would not be bound by that determination simply because it was consistent with 
another ALJ's earlier articulated opinion. 
The PBA, like all parties to any of our improper practice proceedings, always ran 
a risk that one ALJ might disagree with another ALJ on any given issue, or that our 
opinion would be different from that of one or more ALJs, or that a court's opinion would 
be different from ours or the ALJ's on judicial appeal. There was never any guarantee, 
assurance or expectation that the ALJ in this case would hold in accordance with an 
unpublished statement made by a different ALJ in the earlier proceeding, or even if she 
did, that we would be in agreement with her holding or ruling. In filing its charge 
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months after the Village presented its allegedly "regressive" salary demand, the 
Association quite simply exposed itself to the possibility its charge would be held to 
have been untimely filed. 
For the reasons set forth above, the PBA's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's 
decisign dismissing this^charge _ 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STEVEN D. HEADY, et al., 
—. -~ - - Charging Parties,- .-
- and - CASE NO. U-19707 
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS and DUTCHESS 
COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS' PBA, INC., 
Respondents. 
JOHN W. WHITTLESEY, ESQ., for Charging Parties 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing an improper practice 
charge filed by Steven D. Heady and twelve other former employees (charging parties) 
of the County of Dutchess (County) alleging that the County and the Dutchess County 
• Deputy Sheriffs' PBA, Inc. (PBA) had violated, respectively, §209-a.1 (a), (b), (c), (d) 
and (e) and §209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). The charging parties were notified that the charge was deficient in several 
respects. They filed an unsworn amendment and declined to withdraw the charge, 
which was thereafter dismissed by the Director. 
Board - U-19707 -2 
The charge alleges that the County and the PBA violated the Act by entering into 
a collective bargaining agreement which excluded any employees who had resigned or 
transferred to other jobs during the period of retroactivity from eligibility for the 
negotiated retroactive salary increases.1 The Director dismissed the alleged 
§209-a..1(d) and (e) and ..§209-a.2(b) violations, findingjhat individual .empJoyees lack 
standing to allege violations of these sections of the Act. The remaining allegations 
were dismissed upon the Director's finding that no facts were alleged which would 
support a finding that either the County or the PBA had violated the Act. 
The charging parties except to the Director's decision, arguing that they have 
standing and that the County-PBA 1993-1998 contract discriminates against them as 
former employees. Neither the County nor the PBA has responded to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the charging 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
It is well settled that a public employee has no standing to allege a violation of 
the duty to negotiate in good faith, as that duty runs between the public employer and 
1The prior County-PBA contract had expired on December 31, 1992. Protracted 
negotiations resulted in a collective bargaining agreement, reached in August 1997 and 
adopted by the County on October 9, 1997. That agreement, at Article IV, section 2(h) 
provides: 
Retroactive salary increases will be paid only to those 
Employees who are on the payroll on the date of the final 
ratification, or had retired between January 1, 1993 and the 
date of final ratification. Retroactive salary increases shall 
be paid to the estate of any Employee who died between 
January 1, 1993 and the date of final ratification. 
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the employee organization.2 The same rationale applies to claimed violations of 
§209-a.1(e)oftheAct.3 
Likewise, the charging parties, as former employees of the County in a unit 
represented by the PBA, may not claim a violation of §209-a.2 (a) and (c) of the Act by 
the_P_BA,.__We.most recently held in Westchester County Correction Officers' 
Benevolent Association, Inc.:4 
A union's duty of fair representation springs from its status 
under the Act as the exclusive negotiating agent for a unit of 
employees. The statutory grant of exclusivity to the 
bargaining agent entitles it to represent all persons in the 
unit, whether or not they choose to become members of the 
union, but it also imposes upon that union an obligation to 
represent all of those employees fairly, impartially and in 
good faith. But the union's duty is owed only to the persons 
it represents. When an employee's employment relationship 
is severed, the union's representation duties to that former 
employee end, except in circumstances in which the 
severance from employment is being contested or there is 
some other basis upon which to conclude that there is a 
continuing nexus to employment notwithstanding the 
individual's relinquishment or loss of employment. 
Finally, even if we were to find some duty owing to these charging parties on the part 
of the County or the PBA, there are no facts pled which would support a finding of a violation 
of §209-a.1(a) and (c) or §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act. The fact that these charging parties 
did not receive retroactive pay increases to which they would likely have been entitled had 
they continued their employment with the County in the unit represented by 
2CSEA, Local 1000, AFSCME and County of Nassau, 28 PERB P054 (1995); 
CitySch. Dist. of the City of New York, 27 PERB 1J3072 (1994). 
3Queens College of the City Univ. of New York, 21 PERB 1J3024 (1988). 
) 
430 PERB U3075, at 3184 (1997). 
J 
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the PBA does not by itself evidence the discriminatory intent necessary to sustain the 
alleged violations.5 
Based on the foregoing, the charging parties' exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the Director is affirmed. 
JTIS.THEREFOF^E^ 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
A. Abbott, Ivtember 
5County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff and Teamsters Local 264, 27 PERB 
1J3081 (1994). See also Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist. and Local 237, Int'l. 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 7 PERB 1J3058 (1974). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CONNETQUOT CLERICAL ASSOCIATION, 
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- and - CASE NO. C-4722 
CONNETQUOT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Connetquot Central School District 
Unit of Local 870 CSEA (CSEA) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) rendered under a petition filed by the 
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Connetquot Clerical Association (Association). The Association seeks to replace CSEA 
as the bargaining agent for regular full-time and part-time clerical employees of the 
Connetquot Central School District. 
In relevant part, the Director held after a hearing that the Association is an 
employee* organizationi within the meaning of §201.5 of the Public Employees' Fair _ 
Employment Act (Act). 
CSEA argues that the Director erred in holding the Association to be an 
employee organization because it presently lacks a constitution and by-laws and certain 
other allegedly required indicia of an employee organization. The Association argues in 
response that CSEA's exceptions are wholly without basis in fact or law and that the 
Director's decision should be affirmed. The District has not filed any exceptions or 
response. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
CSEA's arguments to us are the same as those made to the Director. The 
Director considered those arguments and correctly rejected them. As the Director held, 
a constitution or by-laws is not a prerequisite for employee organization status. The 
indicia of employee organization status recited in the Director's decision fully satisfy the 
minimal requirements of the Act as interpreted and applied. That the Association could 
have had additional indicia of employee organization status is immaterial. 
The exceptions are denied and the Director's decision is affirmed for the reasons 
set forth in his decision. The case is remanded to the Director for purposes of 
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ascertaining the unit employees' choice of employee organization to serve as their 
representative pursuant to §207.2 of the Act. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THE PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION OF NEW WINDSOR, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. IA97-Q43; M97-327 
TOWN OF NEW WINDSOR, 
Employer. 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN AND O'REILLY (JOHN F. O'REILLY of counsel), for 
Employer 
JOHN K. GRANT, ESQ., for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Town of New Windsor (Town) has filed exceptions to rulings made by the 
Director of Conciliation (Director) in conjunction with compulsory interest arbitration 
proceedings initiated by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of New Windsor, Inc. 
(PBA) under §209.4 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and Part 205 
of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
By letter dated April 15, 1998, the Director declined the Town's request to hold 
the interest arbitration proceedings in abeyance pending the disposition of improper 
practice charges which the Town and the PBA had filed against each other. The PBA 
has since withdrawn its improper practice charge against the Town, but the Town's 
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charge against the PBA is still pending. The Director in the same letter also extended 
the time within which the Town had to designate its member of the arbitration panel and 
directed both the Town and the PBA to strike names from the list of persons submitted 
to them for purposes of their selecting the public member of the interest arbitration 
panel. By letter dated M^ 
to-face meeting among representatives of the Town, the PBA and the agency for 
purposes of conducting this name-striking process. Instead, the Director conducted the 
process by telephone conference call. 
The Town argues that the interest arbitration should not proceed until the 
improper practice charge against the PBA is decided because a finding that the PBA 
had not negotiated in good faith the items it submitted to arbitration would likely result in 
the arbitration being stayed.1 The Town further argues that the Director's ruling 
compels it to undertake extensive and costly preparations for an arbitration which would 
be futile if the improper practice charge were to be decided in its favor. The Director's 
concern about delaying the conduct of the arbitration proceeding could be minimized, 
according to the Town, by an expedited processing of the improper practice charge. 
The Town also argues that the Director's April 15 ruling ignores City of Kingston2 
(hereafter Kingston), in which the Board ordered that an interest arbitration petition not 
be processed. 
J 
1See Binghamton Fire Fighters Local 729, 9 PERB fi3072 (1976); Town of 
Haverstraw Patrolman's Benevolent Ass'n, 9 PERB p 0 6 3 (1976). 
218 PERB H3036(1985). 
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The Town argues that the Director's May 15 ruling violated §205.7 of the Rules 
which requires the parties "meet" for the stated purposes and entitles either party upon 
request to the presence of a Board representative during the name-striking process.3 
The Town requests that the Director be ordered to undertake the striking process anew. 
The PBA argues in resppnsethat the Board does not have "jurisdiction tg_ 
determine the exceptions." On the merits, the PBA argues that the Director's rulings 
are correct in all respects and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's rulings. 
We turn first to the PBA's argument that the Board is powerless to review the 
Director's determinations because neither the Act nor our Rules specifically provides a 
mechanism for the review of such rulings. Although the factual representation is 
correct, the conclusion the PBA would have us draw from it is not. 
We have for many years reviewed Director determinations involving the 
compulsory interest arbitration provisions of the Act and Rules.4 Contrary to the PBA's 
claim, our review is not dependent upon the Director granting a party a right to appeal 
3Section 205.7(b) of the Rules provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
The parties shall be required to meet and make their 
selection . . . . If either party so desires, a representative of 
the board will be present during the name-striking process. 
^Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 30 PERB fl3009 (1997) (subsequent history 
omitted); County of Oneida and Oneida County Sheriff, 20 PERB 1J3044 (1987); Village 
of Southampton, 16 PERB 1J3049 (1983). 
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the determination which is sought to be reviewed.5 Our right and power to review staff 
determinations is inherent in our delegation6 to those persons of the power to make 
them. Moreover, our review is necessary for there to be a final order which can be 
appealed judicially.7 The absence from our Rules of an express procedure for the 
appeal of Director determinations may be an inconvenience to parties, but it is not a bar 
to our review of those determinations. 
As to the merits of the Director's April 15 ruling, neither the interest arbitration 
provisions of the Act nor our implementing Rules contemplates the cancellation of all 
arbitration proceedings when an objection to arbitration in the form of an improper 
practice charge is pending before the agency. The terms of the Act reflect the 
Legislature's desire for the prompt resolution of disputes pending at arbitration. This 
public policy is expressed by the provision of specific time frames for the 
accomplishment of the various steps to be taken during the arbitration process.8 The 
Legislature's expression of a need for speed in interest arbitration is reflected in our 
own Rules, under which an objection to arbitrability postpones only the issuance of an 
award of the contested issues,9 not the arbitration proceedings themselves. Certainly, 
the very preliminary processing of the petition for interest arbitration ordered by the 
5See City of Kingston, 18 PERB 1J8002 (1985), in which the Director informed the 
aggrieved party that exceptions to his ruling could be taken under §201.12 of the Rules. 
6Act §§205.5(k) & (I). 
7Russell v. PERB, 13 PERB 1J7015 (Sup. Ct, Albany Co. 1980). 
8Act §§209.4(b) & (c)(ii). 
9Rules §205.6(d). 
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Director cannot be said to be affected by the pendency of an improper practice charge. 
Expedited treatment10 of improper practice charges raising objections to arbitrability is 
intended to minimize delays in the release of arbitration awards. Expedited treatment 
was never intended to prevent the agency from taking the preliminary steps necessary 
to the appointment of an arbitration panel. ....._ 
There is yet another basic reason to affirm the Director's April 15 ruling. The 
negative effects allegedly caused the Town by the Director's decision to process the 
petition relate to consequences arising only after the arbitration panel is appointed. The 
matters addressed in the Director's April 15 ruling relate only to panel appointment and 
those preliminary matters are not complicated, time-consuming or costly. Once an 
arbitration panel is created, the conduct of the arbitration proceeding is not within this 
agency's direction or control. Under §205.8 of our Rules, the "conduct of the arbitration 
panel shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the arbitration panel." 
Therefore, requests for adjournment of arbitration proceedings for the reasons stated 
by the Town are properly referred to the panel,11 not the Director. A request that the 
Director not process the petition even insofar as the appointment of panel members 
was correctly addressed to the Director, but that request was properly denied by him 
because the Town's arguments do not relate to panel appointment, but to matters 
within the arbitration panel's exclusive control. 
10Rules §205.6(b). 
11A panel has been appointed since the date of the Director's ruling and hearings 
have begun. 
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The Town's reliance on Kingston is misplaced. Without deciding whether 
Kingston was correctly decided, it is plainly distinguishable. 
In Kingston, the Board ordered that an employer's petition for interest arbitration 
not be processed because the union refused to participate in the interest arbitration 
proceedings and asserted its rights under §209-a.1(e) of the Act to the continuation of.... 
the terms of its expired agreement until a new agreement was negotiated. Expressing 
a belief that an arbitration award could not issue in that circumstance, other than one 
preserving the status quo under the expired agreement, the Board concluded in 
Kingston that processing that arbitration petition would be futile. 
The controlling difference between this case and Kingston is that here the cited 
\ futility of the arbitration proceedings is only potential. These arbitration proceedings are 
arguably futile only if the Town prevails on its improper practice charge. In Kingston, on 
the stated principles, the futility of the arbitration process was a certainty. 
Having affirmed the Director's ruling not to stop the processing of this petition,12 
the other aspects of his April 15 ruling are also properly affirmed. The Director did not 
require the Town to appoint its member to the arbitration panel. The Director only 
granted the Town some additional time from his ruling to make its designation. The 
directive to both parties to strike names from the list used to designate the public 
member of the panel was proper as it was in strict compliance with the statutory 
directive in §209.4(c)(ii) of the Act. 
^Accord Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 20 PERB 1J3029 (1987) 
(Director declined union's request to delay filing a response to employer's interest 
/ arbitration petition pending disposition of union's improper practice charge against 
employer). 
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We also affirm the Director's May 15 ruling to conduct the name-striking process 
by telephone conference call. Section 205.7(b) of our Rules, even when read literally, 
does not require a physical presence by anyone. A "meeting" for the purposes of 
§205.7(b) of our Rules can be one conducted telephonically. As the parties are clearly 
present at such a meeting, the PERB representative holding the conference call is 
necessarily and equally "present" at that meeting. Moreover, as the Director noted, 
meetings for purposes of striking names from a list from which the public member of an 
interest arbitration panel is appointed have been conducted telephonically as a matter 
of routine practice since the interest arbitration provisions of the Act were added. The 
Town acknowledges that meetings have been held by telephone, but argues that at 
least the telephone meetings in which it was a participant were held with its consent. 
Without its consent, the Town concludes that a name-striking meeting can only be held 
in person. 
As a meeting conducted by telephone complies with our rules, the issue 
becomes whether holding such a meeting without all participants' consent violates due 
process. Since adjudicatory principles of confrontation do not apply in this context, the 
due process argument must rest on a theory that a practice fair in fact becomes one 
unfair in appearance because the parties cannot see each other. Given the nature and 
limited purpose of the name-striking meeting, we do not find any appearance of 
unfairness in the conduct of the meeting by telephone conference call. In this age of 
technology, it would be inadvisable for us to define a meeting as restrictively as the 
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Town requests. Telephone conference meetings are a standard business practice. In 
fact, telephone conference hearings are conducted by government agencies even 
where the rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses attach. 
As the conduct of a name-striking meeting by telephone conference is entirely 
consistent with even, a literal reading of the rule and any due process.considerations, 
we are persuaded that the Director's May 15, 1998 ruling was correct. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Town's exceptions are denied and the 
Director's rulings are affirmed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, District Council 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82) seeks permission to appeal from a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). Pursuant to a 
petition filed by the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent 
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Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA), the Director ordered an election between NYSCOPBA 
and Council 82 in the Security Services Unit of approximately 25,000 employees of the 
State of New York (State). 
Addressing allegations raised by Council 82 in its response to the petition, the 
Director held that NYSCOPBA is an employee organization within the meaning of 
§201.5 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and that its petition was 
supported by a valid showing of interest from thirty percent of unit employees, as 
evidenced by individually signed employee petitions submitted on the form prescribed 
by the Director pursuant to §201.4(b) of our Rules of Procedures (Rules). The Director 
did not count designation cards submitted by NYSCOPBA in determining that it had 
filed a numerically sufficient showing of interest because it was unnecessary given his 
determination on the employee petitions. For the same reason, the Director also did 
not count any showing of interest which had been revoked, although he observed that 
employee petitions are incapable of being revoked. The Director denied Council 82's 
request for an investigation into its separate allegations that names on NYSCOPBA's 
showing of interest were forgeries upon the conclusion that the allegations did not 
evidence "a fraud or misrepresentation so as to compromise the integrity of PERB's 
procedures." Council 82's allegations that employees were told the petitions they 
signed would only be used to send them information were disregarded by the Director 
because the petition form they signed clearly states that its purpose is to cause 
NYSCOPBA's certification and the decertification of Council 82. 
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Council 82 requests that we review those aspects of the Director's decision 
concerning NYSCOPBA's showing of interest.1 Council 82 alleges the following as 
errors by the Director: 
1. His decision to count signatures on the petition form which consist of an initial 
instead of a full first name. _ _.„ _.._. 
2. His declination to conduct an investigation into the allegations of 
possible forgery and misrepresentation. 
3. His decision to count signatures allegedly obtained upon a misrepresentation 
by NYSCOPBA's officers and agents as to the purpose or effect of the 
signature on the showing of interest. 
4. His alleged decision to count illegible signatures. 
5. His declination to rule on the validity of the designation cards obtained by 
NYSCOPBA through the mail. 
6. His alleged failure to exclude from the calculation of the showing of 
interest any evidences from employees who had submitted a 
revocation. 
NYSCOPBA argues in a multi-point response to the exceptions that interlocutory 
review of Council 82's exceptions is not warranted and that none of the Director's 
several determinations regarding the sufficiency of the showing of interest are 
reviewable by the Board because they all are necessarily encompassed within the 
Director's ministerial conclusion that the showing of interest is numerically sufficient. If 
1No exceptions were taken to the Director's holding that NYSCOPBA is an 
employee organization within the meaning of the Act. 
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and to the extent we should review any of the Director's determinations, NYSCOPBA 
argues that those determinations are correct and within the range of discretion 
bestowed upon the Director under the Rules. Should the Director's decision not be 
reviewed in a timely fashion, be reversed in any respect, or remanded on any point, 
NYSCOPBA requests that we order an election in which the ballots, wo.uld.be... 
impounded upon return for such time as may be necessary. 
The State has not responded to the arguments advanced by either of the other 
parties. 
Having reviewed the record, and having considered the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the Director's decision in part and remand the matter to him for further 
investigation into the showing of interest submitted by NYSCOPBA. 
Preliminarily, we must decide whether to grant permission to appeal from any of 
the Director's several rulings. Appeal at this point in the representation proceeding is 
by permission only pursuant to §201.9(c)(4) of our Rules. 
It has been held repeatedly that rulings incidental to the processing of a 
representation petition will not be reviewed while the petition is pending before the 
Director unless there are extraordinary circumstances warranting that interlocutory 
review.2 We are persuaded upon consideration of the totality of circumstances in this 
case that we should not withhold review of the issues raised by the exceptions and 
response until after an election is held. 
2See, e.g., County of Putnam, 31 PERB |f3031 (1998). 
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The exceptions question the very propriety of conducting an election because 
preconditions to that election have allegedly not been satisfied. A post-election review 
of Council 82's exceptions would not allow for a meaningful review of those exceptions. 
The election to which objection is made would have been conducted before any 
decision on the propriety of the Director's having ordered that election would have 
issued. Moreover, many of the issues presented for decision are novel and affect all 
certification/decertification proceedings before this agency. As explained more fully in 
our discussion which follows, there is no decision at any level on several issues raised 
by the exceptions. There are Director level decisions on certain others, and any Board 
precedent with respect to any other issues is general, at best. Accepting this appeal at 
this point will permit for a consideration of these largely novel and important issues 
without risking that those issues will be mooted by the results of an election or that they 
will not be pursued after an election for other reasons. The agency staff who are 
responsible for the processing of representation petitions and our clientele deserve 
guidance on the several issues presented by these exceptions. Only by reviewing 
these exceptions now can we ensure that this guidance is supplied. Finally, 
extraordinary circumstance is presented by the practical realities associated with the 
conduct of a mail ballot election involving 25,000 employees. This is, quite simply, not 
a typical election proceeding. Postponing consideration of the issues raised by these 
exceptions opens the possibility, were NYSCOPBA to win the election, that the results 
might have to be set aside and the petition dismissed. The waste of time and money 
occasioned in that circumstance and the resulting voter frustration, confusion and anger 
should be avoided. Nor do we believe it is conducive to the conduct of a fair election 
Board - C-4800 -6 
and informed voter choice to have either party campaign under such a cloud of 
unresolved allegations. These circumstances can only be avoided if we entertain the 
exceptions now. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to grant permission for review 
of the Director's several rulings, a review which will not delay an election because the 
election which had been scheduled tentatively has been postponed by the Director. . 
Before reaching the showing of interest exceptions, we must determine the effect 
of §201.4(c) of our Rules on our power to do so. 
Section 201.4(c) of our Rules provides as follows: 
The determination by the Director as to the timeliness of a showing 
of interest and of its numerical sufficiency is a ministerial act and 
will not be reviewed by the Board. 
As this rule is aberrational in that it bars our review of certain Director 
determinations, which are otherwise all reviewable, it should be and has been 
construed narrowly. For example, notwithstanding the phrase "numerical sufficiency", it 
has been held that §201.4(c) of the Rules does not bar.the Board's review of the 
Director's determination that a showing of interest is numerically insufficient.3 In our 
view, the Board's power to review the several showing of interest determinations made 
by the Director in this case is much clearer than the exercise of review power 
undertaken in the stated example. 
The issues we are asked to review pursuant to Council 82's exceptions involve 
the types of evidences which can be counted as a showing of interest. There is a plain 
difference between the types of a showing of interest which may be properly considered 
3State of New York, 11 PERB P106 (1978). 
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by the Director and his calculations based thereon once the evidences are accepted as 
valid as to type and form. The former is primarily, if not exclusively, a question of law, 
not fact, and there is nothing "ministerial" in the Director's determination as to what 
types of evidences may be accepted as a showing of interest. 
The Board specifically reviewed and affirmed the Director's determination that a 
showing of interest was sufficient in State of New York (Office of Employee Relations).* 
The decisions in State of New York (Division of State Police)5 and Board of Education 
of the City of Yonkers6 are not to the contrary of our conclusion in this respect. In both 
of those cases, the showing of interest as submitted was unquestionably in permissible 
form. Neither case supports a proposition that the Director's acceptance of a showing 
of interest submitted in impermissible form is beyond our power to review pursuant to 
exceptions raising that issue. 
Having decided these two preliminary issues, we proceed to an analysis of 
Council 82's exceptions, certain of which do not require any extensive discussion. 
ILLEGIBILITY 
Nothing in the Director's decision supports a conclusion that he counted toward 
satisfaction of the showing of interest requirements any names which are illegible. 
Indeed, the content of the Director's decision reflecting what he actually counted 
410 PERB 1J3108 (1977)(subsequent history omitted). 
515PERB 1J3014 (1982). 
610 PERB 1f3100 (1977). 
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) 
suggests clearly that only names which were legible were included in the Director's 
calculation of the numerical sufficiency of the showing of interest. 
To provide guidance to the Director and clientele for the filing and processing of 
future petitions, we venture to state the obvious. Names of unit employees as 
submitted on a showing of interest must be legible to the pointof enabling the Director 
to identify that person as one on the list of unit employees submitted by the employer. 
Names which the Director finally determines to be illegible are not to be counted. 
MISREPRESENTATIONS 
We deny any of Council 82's exceptions grounded upon allegations that certain 
unit employees were persuaded to sign NYSCOPBA's petition upon representations 
that their signing would only lead to their being sent additional information. 
We have not discovered from our research any decision in which the Board has 
addressed this issue. The Director, however, has long held that allegations of 
misrepresentation will be disregarded if the purpose of the showing of interest is clear 
from its face.7 
NYSCOPBA's showing of interest, as counted by the Director, consists of 
employee petitions submitted on a form currently prescribed by the Director pursuant to 
our Rules. That petition form was drafted in a manner to ensure that employees would 
understand its purpose and the effect of their signing it. The showing of interest 
petitions submitted by NYSCOPBA state clearly that the signatures will be used to 
support a petition to be filed with PERB for the purpose of certifying NYSCOPBA and 
J 7Niagara County Community College and County of Niagara, 23 PERB TJ4014 
(1990); State of New York, 17 PERB 1J4075 (1984). 
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decertifying Council 82 as the negotiating agent for the Security Services Unit. There 
would be no point in having a prescribed form if, when that form were used, the Director 
were still required to investigate allegations that persons were in some way misled as to 
the purpose of the showing of interest petition. 
When the showing of interest consists of employee petitions submitted on the 
agency's prescribed form, or the showing of interest of different type is otherwise clear 
as to its purpose on its face, we will not entertain or investigate allegations that persons 
were induced to sign that showing of interest by misrepresentations as to its purpose. 
REVOCATIONS 
Council 82 urged the Director not to count toward NYSCOPBA's satisfaction of 
the showing of interest requirements the names of any persons who had revoked their 
support for NYSCOPBA's representation petition before it was filed. It submitted to the 
Director revocations from approximately forty-five employees who claimed to have 
earlier signed NYSCOPBA's showing of interest petition. The Director did not count 
these revoked signatures because they did not affect the numerical sufficiency of the 
showing of interest. Nonetheless, the Director went on to state that under §201.4(b) of 
the Rules only dues deduction authorizations are capable of being revoked. 
As with the preceding misrepresentation issue, our research has not disclosed 
any Board decision about whether and when revocations of any form of a showing of 
interest should be honored. As this is a recurring issue at the Director level, we once 
again take this opportunity to provide instruction in this respect both for purposes of this 
proceeding on remand and for petitions filed hereafter. 
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As we understand the Director's policy and practice from this and prior 
decisions,8 the Director will only honor revocations of dues deduction authorizations and 
only then if the revocation is clear and tendered to the petitioner before it files the 
representation petition. We conclude that the policy as articulated above is one 
consistent with the Act and Rules, with the proviso that it applies equally to revocations 
of all permissible forms of a showing of interest, not just dues deduction authorizations. 
Although §201.4(b) of our Rules requires that dues deduction authorizations not 
be revoked as a condition to their being considered "timely", that does not mean, and is 
not intended to mean, that all other forms of a showing of interest are incapable of 
being revoked under any circumstances. Showings of interest are, in essence, nothing 
more than an expression of an employee's state of mind regarding a representation 
question as of a certain date. Underlying all showings of interest of any type is an 
individual's authorization for the petitioner to submit that showing of interest on the 
employee's behalf. An individual who has authorized the submission of an evidence to 
establish that person's interest in a representation proceeding should be and is 
empowered to revoke that authorization in a timely and proper manner. 
Revocations of a showing of interest are to be on notice from the employee to a 
petitioner stating clearly that permission to use that person's name for the stated 
purposes has been rescinded. Without notice, a petitioner would not have any reason 
to suspect that there was a need to collect any additional showing of interest. The 
prejudice to a petitioner and the employee interests that the petitioner represents is 
See County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 13 PERB 1J4060 (1980). 
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unreasonable and is easily avoided by the requirement of advance notice. 
Furthermore, to be honored, a revocation must be actually received by the petitioner at 
a date sufficiently in advance of the filing of the petition to permit a petitioner a 
reasonable opportunity to remove the name from the showing of interest. If by the date 
a petition is filed a showing of interest has not been revoked by the employee who had 
authorized submission of that evidence in the manner prescribed, that showing is to be 
counted, assuming it is otherwise proper in form. Employee revocations submitted after 
a petition is filed are to be disregarded by the Director. 
The three remaining showing of interest issues are those which we conclude 
necessitate a remand to the Director for investigation. 
DESIGNATION CARDS 
The Director did not decide whether designation cards obtained by NYSCOPBA 
through the mail should be counted because he determined that the showing of interest 
in the form of employee petitions was otherwise sufficient. NYSCOPBA argues that we 
should not consider any issues associated with the designation cards because 
Council 82 is not aggrieved by the Director's declination to rule on the validity of those 
cards such that it is without standing to raise those issues. Moreover, as a matter not 
decided by the Director, NYSCOPBA submits that the issues associated with the 
designation cards are not ripe for our review. 
In the context of a representation proceeding, our review of Director 
determinations is not and should'not depend upon notions of standing or ripeness. 
Representation proceedings are investigatory in nature and they involve issues which 
transcend the interests of the parties to a particular proceeding. The validity of a 
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showing of interest obtained through the mail is an issue which has not been the 
subject of any decision by this agency at any level. However, we understand it may be 
a common campaign tool, particularly in large, geographically wide-spread units with 
remote work locations, as is the case here. For this reason, it is an issue that is likely to 
lead to future litigation. Indeed, we know from notice taken of documents on file with 
the Director that this same issue has been raised under a petition (C-4810) filed by 
NYSCOPBA with respect to the Security Supervisors Unit, which is also currently 
represented by Council 82. By declining to consider the designation card issue in this 
case, we do little more than postpone the inevitable for no persuasive reason. 
Moreover, as we are remanding for further investigation the showing of interest resting 
upon the employee petitions, the designation cards may assume an importance not 
present when the Director issued his decision. 
Council 82 argues that the designation cards are invalid because NYSCOPBA 
cannot vouch with certainty that the cards were signed by unit employees. That is likely 
true for designation cards sent and returned by mail, but that same proposition is 
equally true for most face-to-face solicitations of a showing of interest. Unless a 
solicitor asks for identification from each signatory, or each signatory is known 
personally by the solicitor, neither of which is required under our Rules or expected, 
there is never a guarantee that the person signing the showing of interest is, in fact, that 
person. 
We should not erect insurmountable barriers to an exercise by unit employees of 
their right to reassess periodically their choice of a bargaining agent. That right is 
fundamental. Therefore, there is nothing, perse, which invalidates a showing of 
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interest solicited and/or obtained through the mail. At the same time, however, we 
cannot permit a showing of interest to be obtained in a manner which provides no 
reasonable assurance that the evidences accurately reflect the desires of persons who 
are unit employees. 
The broad outlines of NYSCOPBA's solicitation of the designation cards do not 
appear to be in dispute on this record. Thousands of cards were mailed by 
NYSCOPBA to persons whom it believed to be unit employees at their home 
addresses. Accompanying the cards were two letters. One explained the legal aspects 
of decertification; the other, the benefits of joining NYSCOPBA in its efforts to decertify 
Council 82. Certain of the cards were distributed to employees at work locations. 
Some others may have been left at unspecified locations for pickup by unit employees. 
Of the designation cards obtained by NYSCOPBA, most were returned through the 
mail. Employees were not supplied either a return envelope or postage. It is unclear 
whether any were returned in other ways. The designation cards themselves attest that 
the person signing is a State employee and is supporting NYSCOPBA's petition for its 
certification and the decertification of Council 82. The card contains spaces for the 
insertion of name, address, home phone number, work department/facility, job title, 
signature, and date. The particulars regarding the distribution, collection and return of 
those cards are not, however, as clear. It is for this reason that the issues concerning 
the designation cards are appropriately remanded to the Director for investigation as 
necessary9 as to the precise manner of their distribution and return and the 
depending upon the outcome of the investigation ordered as to the employee 
petitions, the Director may not need to examine the designation cards. The order in 
which the Director conducts the investigations is at the Director's discretion. 
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circumstances upon which the declaration of authenticity, as it pertains to those cards, 
was made. If and to the extent the Director concludes from this investigation that there 
is a reasonable degree of assurance that the cards were executed by an employee in 
the Security Services Unit, and that the declaration of authenticity requirements are 
satisfied as to those cards, the cards may be counted, provided they are otherwise in 
proper form and all other conditions to those cards being counted are satisfied. 
Alternatively, if the Director concludes that there is not from a totality of all relevant 
circumstances a reasonable assurance that the designation cards were signed by unit 
employees, or that the declaration of authenticity requirements are not satisfied, then, 
like any other form of a showing of interest, the designation cards should not be 
counted. 
We are left with two questions concerning the showing of interest. First, whether 
evidences of a showing of interest bearing only an initial for a first name10 were properly 
counted by the Director. Second, whether the Director reasonably declined to conduct 
any investigation into Council 82's allegations of possible forgery and fraud in 
conjunction with the collection and submission of the showing of interest. 
SIGNING BY INITIALS 
Section 201.4(b) of our Rules requires both designation cards and employee 
petitions to be "signed" and refers to the persons who sign those evidences as 
"signatories". Lacking any special definition for those words, they can only be given 
their common legal meaning. By any definition, those quoted words plainly incorporate 
10There is no indication that the Director counted any evidence bearing an initial 
only for a last name. 
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a requirement that the showing of interests in the form submitted by NYSCOPBA bear 
the signature of a unit employee. Although a signature can be in any number of 
forms,11 including initials12 and print,13 when the first name of a signature is represented 
by initials only, extrinsic evidence establishing the identity of the signer is necessary 
before a signature requirement is satisfied.14 
[A]n initial letter may denote any one of a great number of names, 
and, unaided by proof of any other fact, designate the person with -
but little more certainty than as though the name abbreviated by 
the initial was wholly omitted.15 
A showing of interest petition is signed for purposes of §201.4(b) of our Rules 
only if it satisfies two conditions. The name as signed must identify the signer,16 and 
when the showing is in support of a petition for certification/decertification, as is 
NYSCOPBA's, it must establish that the person signing is included in the unit which the 
petitioner seeks to represent. Without additional evidence, an initial in place of a full 
first name cannot do either. 
NYSCOPBA's arguments are directed to an invalidation of signatures containing 
initials. As we are not invalidating any signature, NYSCOPBA's arguments that 
signatures containing initials for first names can be valid miss the point. We recognize 
11N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law §46. 
12ln re Mack's Will, 21 A.D.2d 205 (3d Dep't 1964). 
^Mesibov, Glinert & Levy, Inc. v. Cullen Bros. Mfg. Co., 245 N.Y. 305 (1927); 
Pearlberg v. Levisohn, 112 Misc. 95 (2d Dep't 1920). 
"People v. Smith, 45 N.Y. 772 (1871). 
15/c/. at 779. 
^Wagner v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 154 Misc. 123 at 125 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 
1934): "The all-important thing is the question of identification." 
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that signatures can be in the form of a first name as represented by an initial. Indeed, a 
person may not have a full first name, only an initial: If the employee list submitted by 
an employer identifies that the employee is carried on its official records with only an 
initial as a first name, a signing corresponding to that initial would be a valid signature. 
.Apart from this unusual circumstance, we hold only that what can be a signature does 
not become one until and unless the identity of the person signing a first name with 
initials is established by extrinsic evidence. We do not specify what types of extrinsic 
evidence will serve to establish the identity of the signer for there are likely many. 
Notwithstanding the clear law pertaining to signatures, NYSCOPBA argues that 
we can do nothing but accept signatures in which the first name is abbreviated by an 
initial because the Director stated in his decision that this is how our rules regarding 
signed showing of interests have been "historically applied". 
There are two basic responses to NYSCOPBA's argument in this regard. As 
NYSCOPBA itself admits, this issue has never been presented for decision at any level 
within the agency. Therefore, it is simply not possible to conclude reasonably that any 
Director has ever made a conscious decision to accept initials as signatures with 
knowledge that the use of initials do not, without more, identify the signer, for that would 
represent a knowing rejection by the Director of the basic required elements of a 
signature. Even were we to assume that the Director came to that conclusion, the 
Director's alleged historical practice taken pursuant to that conclusion is not attributable 
to this or any other Board. It has never been any Board's policy or practice to examine 
any showing of interest, or any other substantive or procedural issue, except in the 
context of exceptions raising that issue. As this showing of interest issue has never 
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before been submitted to any Board, no Board could have adopted a policy or practice 
reflecting a determination that signatures embodying initials for a first name are 
identifying and valid perse. Therefore, NYSCOPBA's arguments that a decision 
contrary to the Director's would retroactively change Board policy or practice in violation 
of its due process rights is without merit. 
Upon remand, the Director must conduct a further investigation to ascertain by 
resort to extrinsic evidence whether the noted conditions to a valid signature can be 
satisfied in signings with first name initials. To aid that investigation upon remand, we 
can offer only little guidance. The prescribed petition form contains lines for both a 
printed and scripted signature. As a signature can be made in either form, if a full first 
name and last name is printed or scripted, the noted conditions are satisfied, barring 
any issues as to the authenticity of that signature. Beyond this, the nature and extent 
of the investigation rest within the Director's discretion if the investigation is objectively 
reasonable and conducive to ascertaining that the stated signature conditions have 
been satisfied. 
FORGERY AND FRAUD ALLEGATIONS 
Section 201.4(e) of our Rules authorizes the Director to investigate a showing of 
interest and the accompanying declaration of authenticity whenever the Director deems 
it appropriate to guard against forgery and fraud in the collection and submission of 
these documents. The conduct of such an investigation is within the Director's sound 
discretion under the Rules. This does not mean, however, as NYSCOPBA argues, that 
the Director's decision not to conduct an investigation is one we cannot review, only 
that the Director's decision to that effect may be set aside only for an abuse of that 
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discretion. It has been held generally that an investigation into a showing of interest or 
declaration of authenticity is not warranted unless there is information, beyond mere 
conjecture, which casts doubt upon the authenticity of the showing of interest.17 What 
we are asked to decide in this case for the first time is what level of proof is necessary 
to support a.conclusion that the Director.has abused discretion in deciding not to 
conduct any investigation into allegations of fraud and forgery made by a party to a 
representation proceeding. 
Just as we did for the issues earlier discussed, in answering this question, we 
must strike a balance which accommodates what are at times competing interests and 
conflicting demands upon the agency. On the one hand, we cannot set a standard of 
proof so low that the Director would always be forced to investigate showings of interest 
and declarations of authenticity for forgery and falsity. That result would unreasonably 
and unnecessarily delay the representation process itself and burden this agency's 
resources. On the other hand, we cannot set a standard of proof so high that it 
encourages the very forgery and fraud we strive to prevent by creating a circumstance 
in which no petitioner need reasonably fear an investigation into its showing of interest 
submissions and declarations. As earlier parts of our decision reflect, we are sensitive 
to the many problems confronting a petitioner which is attempting to collect a showing 
of interest, particularly in a large unit. We can be no less sensitive to the problems 
confronting the challenged employee organization, which is required to make a detailed 
response to a representation petition, including any allegations pertaining to showing of 
State of New York (Office of Employee Relations), supra note 4. 
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interest, which it may not review, within ten working days after its receipt of the 
representation petition from the Director.18 
Having carefully considered this issue in light of the considerations stated above, 
we conclude that there was enough objective and persuasive evidence presented to the 
Director to warrant some further investigation into the showing of interest and 
accompanying declaration of authenticity. We emphasize that our remand does not 
suggest that there are, in fact, any forgeries in the showing of interest, or, to whatever 
extent there may be forgeries, that those are attributable to any malfeasance or 
misfeasance by NYSCOPBA. We simply hold that the Director abused his discretion in 
not undertaking some further investigation of these allegations. 
We agree with the Director that Council 82's articulated belief that NYSCOPBA 
could not have collected signature petitions and cards from thirty percent of the unit 
employees would not, by itself, warrant investigation. We conclude, however, that the 
objective evidence relating to Council 82's observation of NYSCOPBA's solicitation 
efforts lend support to other evidences warranting an investigation in this respect. 
These other evidences are in essentially two parts. 
First, wide-spread use has been made of initials on the showing of interest 
petitions. The very form of this showing of interest opens itself to the possibility of 
forgery and fraud.19 Again, we are not suggesting that there is, in fact, forgery or fraud 
in the showing of interest or the declaration of authenticity, only that the form of the 
18Rules §201.5(d). 
19See Parcel 242 Realty v. New York State Div. of Housing and Community 
Renewal, 215 A.D.2d 132 (1st Dep't 1995). 
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showing of interest actually submitted lends itself to that misuse. Second, Council 82 
was able to secure, within the time limits allowed, witnessed but unsworn statements 
from twenty-two unit employees stating that they had not signed any showing of interest 
on behalf of NYSCOPBA. The Director found the names of eight of these twenty-two 
employees on the. showing of interest, but proceeded no further than to not count those 
eight showings. 
As relevant to the conduct of this aspect of a showing of interest investigation, 
the issue is not whether showing of interest evidences of arguably "dubious validity"20 
affect the numerical sufficiency of the showing of interests submitted by NYSCOPBA. 
Standing alone, they almost certainly do not. The significance of the discovery of 
N arguable forgeries in eight showings of interest out of a universe of twenty-two 
employees from whom Council 82 was able to secure statements is that they 
reasonably suggest a possibility of forgeries within the showing of interest evidences 
which are identical in type and which were obtained in similar fashion. Without 
suggesting, as did the Director, that the only concern to the agency in relevant respect 
is forgery and fraud at a level so high that it actually affects the numerical sufficiency of 
a showing of interest, an investigation beyond the eight signatures is appropriate to 
determine whether and to what extent there are, in fact, forgeries within the showing of 
interest and, if so, whether NYSCOPBA bears responsibility for those forgeries. 
The Director's statement in this regard did not represent a finding by him that 
any of the eight showings of interest were, in fact, of "dubious validity", only that the 
conclusion could be arguably derived from the nature of the evidences submitted by 
Council 82. 
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As NYSCOPBA itself recognizes, statements by individuals attesting that they 
did not sign the showing of interest evidences bearing their name are serious ones and 
we have taken them seriously. At this point, those statements, even though unsworn, 
are entitled to weight in considering whether to require the Director to conduct some 
further investigation, _ _ _ 
In furtherance of its argument that no investigation in this regard is warranted, 
NYSCOPBA has submitted to us a copy of the showing of interests bearing the 
signatures of the eight persons who stated that they did not sign any showing of 
interest, and a copy of the statements those eight persons submitted to Council 82, 
which also bear their signature. NYSCOPBA asks us to compare the two signatures of 
each of the eight individuals as they appear on the two documents. It argues that even 
a cursory comparison will reveal that the signatures on the two documents are the 
same, such that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that there is any forgery or 
fraud in the showing of interest. As those signatures are on documents of record, we 
have done as requested and we cannot come to a conclusive determination as to 
whether and to what extent the signatures are similar or dissimilar or whether each 
signature within the pair was signed by the same person. This is, therefore, 
appropriately a matter for the Director's determination after such investigation as he 
considers to be appropriate. 
As with the investigation ordered to establish the identity and unit inclusion of 
persons whose signature includes an initial for, or as, a first name, we do not order that 
the investigation into allegations of fraud and forgery take any particular form or 
proceed in any particular order. That is a matter reserved to the Director's discretion 
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provided that the methods chosen are objectively reasonable and suited to 
accomplishment of the stated ends. An acceptable investigation, however, might be 
one comparing signatures using a statistically relevant random sampling of the 
signatures on the showings of interest and the signatures of unit employees on 
.documents submitted to the Director by Council 82 for the very purpose ofcomparison. 
This suggestion is, of course, illustrative only and it is not intended to prevent the 
Director from opting for a different type or multiple types of investigation. 
NYSCOPBA requests we order an election notwithstanding the pendency of any 
investigation we might order. Since the date of his decision, the Director has 
postponed the election for reasons unrelated to those pending before us. An order 
requiring the Director hold an election is inappropriate in this circumstance. 
Rescheduling of the election should be at the Director's order. 
For the reasons set forth above, the matter is remanded to the Director for the 
conduct of investigations consistent with our decision herein. In all other respects, the 
exceptions are denied. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ULSTER COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4785 
COUNTY OF ULSTER and ULSTER COUNTY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Ulster County Community College Faculty 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4785 page 2 
Unit: Included: All adjunct/part-time faculty. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectjyely with the Ulster County Community College Faculty Association. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc K. AbboifT Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNCIL 66 AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4787 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
UNITED SERVICE WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
SEIU, AFL-CIO a/k/a UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 424, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union, 
United Service Workers of America, SEIU, AFL-CIO a/k/a United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424 has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
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employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Attachment A. 
Excluded: All other employees: 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union, United Service 
Workers of America, SEIU, AFL-CIO a/k/a United Public Service Employees Union 
Local 424. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, wlember 
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Asecuns Clerk Typiat 
Accoun:i.-<9 Supervisor 
Accounting Supervisor Grade B 
••Administrative- Asst 
Administrative OSJicsr 
Alcoholism Counselor Trainee 
Aieehei iss Counselor t 
A leohe-llrw^CautvaaiLo-^;! t;v , 
Aleflhcliam^Caunealor^tir 
Assoc Esplcymant & Training Coerd 
-•• Assoc Planner .. 
Assoc Graphic Art i s t 
Aaaia-itf." Buildlr.g Superintendent (tlVCC) 




Automotive Mechanic <nVCO 
Actlv-*y Therapist 
Build.-.; haiotena.nee Helper (HVCCl 
Buildm? hair-tenance Mechanic cnvcCi 
Builctr.; naintenanee Worker tnvco 
Bulldir.j Maintenance Supervise?- ihYCC> 
ButUin? Superintendent (MVCCl 
Buyer 
Campus Security CSiieer (nVCC) 
GAP ; Gocr-dinst,* r' 
CAP -Rurae' -
'CAP^ec'ialvWcrteer ' ; 
0»we* Supervisor Grade A 
Case £' i;ervtgor Crade B 
Caae'icrVier 
Caehiar 
Chiei £3ctal ^ e l i a r e Examiner 
Child %Family S p e c i a l i s t 
CierK 
Clerk Typist 
Central Stores Clerk 
Community Service Aide 
Co«*uiUty Service Worker 
Community Service Worker tSpanish Speaking) 
Computtr Programming Technician 
Coeputer Operator 
» Coniidential Investigator 
« Con4il*n«lal Support Investigator 
* Contract Administrator 
Crisis Intervention Counselor 
Cuetoeer Relations Supervisor 
Data Cntrr Hachino Operator 
• Director of Data Processing Services 
Oireeiof ai Records nanagement 
Disbursement© Oiiiear 
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wnise C o l l a r <Adminis trat ive) U n i t " 
E L e c n e i a n (Fl'/CC 
Electronic Data, P r o c e s s i n g Clark 
E»piaym«nt 4 Training Counse lor 
Emplcyment «. Training S p e c i a l P r o j e c t Coord 
Environments! hea l th & S a f e t y S p e c i a l i s t <KYCC> 
Flr.aft.ce A d m i n i s t r a t i v e O f f i c e r 
Family S e r v i c e S p e c i a l i s t 
General. S t o r e s l i fer* CUVCC 
Ora.-.s Jury Ste-.o 
Graphic A r t i s t 
Mead Scc^al V e l i s r s examiner 
""Hrse'-icenetivs' 
Hcte HesltD K'-<Le 
Ir.ver.tcry Records Clerk 
Jr: re'.-elapweni & Placement HH 
Jr ?lanner 
La; Tech * Su*et=ne* Abuse 
L?>: Suis^ar-.c* Abud« 
Litrary CIerfc_ l".VCC> 
Lirr.t r.P'.cr Eccisraent Operator (ftYCC) 
r a i l Cler* ( HVCCJ 
Kail Courier 
Has Room Cleri: 
. ledical Auditir.e S u p e r v i s o r 
nsdtsa i Records Clerk 
Kscicai S e r v i e a Coord 
ftidisal S c c i a l Vsrk Superv i sor 
ftsiicai S o c i a l Worker 
Heeicai Werner 
f.isr* Computer S p e c i a l i s t 
flicrciil» Operator 
rlc"sr V e h i c l e H e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
tz-.zr V e h i c l e Operator (HVCCi 
Utr.cr V e h i c l e Bureau S u p e r v i s o r 
Nutr i t i on Outreach Coord 
Outreach S e r v i e e a Sep 
Gu'.reach Worker 
C i i e e t D u p l i c a t i n g Machine Operator 
Painter (MVCC) 
• Para Lega l Agst 
Psrent. Aid* 
Psrent Aide Superv i sor 
Pr.iebctctniet Cutreaefc Worker 
P'nata Machine Operator 
Phys ica l Educ S p e c i a l i s t 
Planner 
Preventive fiamtenenee Coordinator <HVCCJ 
Principal Account CLerK 
- Principal Accounting Supervisor 
Principal Social Welfare Examiner 
Principal Clerk 
Principal Typist (Sec Sve only* 
Printing Helper 
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White CsUar tAomini8trativ*l Unit 
} Printir-? Supervisor 
Frohatisn l a s t 




Public Health Engineer 
Pyplie Kealth Sanitar ian 
Public Wealth Technician 
Purchasing Agent tftvcC) 
Research S p e c i a l i s t 
Real Property Tax Service Coord. 
Resource I i w e s t i g a t c r - -
Soc ia l Service Inves t iga tor 
Secretary ta Real Property Tax Service 
Soc ia l *e l fare E*an;.ner 
Soc ia l Vcrk Aset 
' Sr Acszwnt Clerk 
Sr Accent Clerk-Tysiiit 
Sr Atniriiatratiwo Asst 
Sr Ausiit Clerk 




.Sr Computer Operator 
) • Sr Cer.ilc'ential I n v e s t i g a t o r 
Sr Data Entry Machine Operator 
Sr Draftsman 
Sr EkT Coord 
Sr EiT Counselor 
Sr •Nutrition Outreach Worker 
Sr Payrall Clark 
5r Planner 
Sr Probation Of i i eer 
Sr Pusi ic Health Sanitarian 
Sr Social Welfare Examiner 
Sr Stenographer 
Sr Support Co l l ec tor 
•>• •. Sr Support I n v e s t i g a t o r 
Sr Tax Map Technician 
Sr Typist 
Stenographer 
Step-DWl Program Administrator 
Storekeeper <nVCO 
Substance Abuee Counselor Trainee 
Substance Abuse Counselor 2 
Substance Abuse Counselor I t 
Substance Abuse Counselor I I I 
Support I n v e s t i g a t o r 
H Supervleor of Building Serv ice (XVCO 
Supervising Campue Securi ty Offieer (HVCCJ 
U Supervising CAP Murae 
06/17/98 09:3E RADISSON HOTE-.+UTICPI -> 3156S2S254 N0.563 004 
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White Collar t A d m i n i s t r a t i s Unit. 
Supervising Support Col lec tor 
) Supervising Support Inves t igator 
SyttBBO A n a l y s t 
Substance Abuse Hurge Prac t i t ioner 




Victim « i t n » e e Ceard 
Vocational Educational Counselor 
• Welfare HAnage*©nt Coord 
VIC Nutrit ion Technician 
WIC H w t r i t i o n u t 




» Oneida County titles 
*• KVCC position Human ResoureeQ gniy 
TITLES: EXCLUDED 
A liuiieiciuie n i i e s 
Deputy Director of Veteran's Svcs. 
1st Deputy County Clerk 
Highway Maintenance Supervisor 
Staff Development Supervisor 
Deputy Commissioner of DPW -Highways & Bridges 
Secretary to Commissioner of Aviation 
Secretary to DPW Commissioner 
Asst. Civil Engineer 
Secretary to Commissioner of Mental Health 
Director of Staff Development 
Deputy County Clerk (5) 
Director of Nursing 
Asst. County Attbrney 
Special Asst. County Attorney 
Alternatives to Incarceration Director 
1st Asst. District Attorney (2) 
Supervising Nurse 
Director of Weights and Measures 
Secretary to Commissioner of Personnel 
Staff Development Asst. 
Executive Secretary 





Coordinator Child Support Enforcement 
Principal Typist 
Project Director 
Motor Pool Coord. 
Secretary to the Board 
Deputy Clerk of the Board 
Secretary to County Clerk 
Secretary to Employment & Training Director 
Director of Administrative Services 
Director of Residential Services 
Secretary to Commissioner of Finance 
Secretary to County Attorney 
Legislative Analyst - Minority 
Legislative Analyst - Majority 
Substance Abuse Clinical Program Supervisor 
Director of Income Maintenance 
Asst. Executive Director of Substance Abuse Svcs 
Asst. Director of Nursing 
Public Education Coord. 
Secretary to Public Defender 
Secretary to Administrator of 
Social Service Attorney (3) 
Deputy Commissioner of Mental 
Director of Patient Services 
Supervising Public Health Nurse 
Asst. Eng ineer (2) 
1st Asst. Public Defender (6) 
Broadacres 
Health 
STATE OF NEW YORK ) 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA ) ss: 
RE: COUNTY OF ONEIDA WHITE 
COLLAR/(ADMINISTRATrVE) UNIT 
DECLARATION OF AUTHENTICITY 
In accordance with PERB Rules and Regulations Section 201.4 f£, as amended, the following 
Declaration is submitted along with the Filing of the Showing of Interest with 
Certification/Decertification Petition herewith: 
1. (A) Individual Executing the Declaration: Eugene Capicotto 
(B) Declarant's authority: Declarant Eugene Capicotto is Second Vice-President 
for AFSCME Council 66 and has been authorized by an overwhelming majority of effected 
individuals to submit to PERB their original Authorization Cards. AFSCME Council 66, 
AFL-CIO is a servicing labor organization representing affiliated labor organizations 
throughout New York State; its Syracuse Area Office is located at 8180 Cazenovia Road, 
Manlius, New York 13104 (Tel.# (315) 682-9198). 
2. Upon Declarant's information and belief, based upon inquiries made, the persons 
who names appear upon the Authorization Cards submitted have themselves signed such 
evidences on the dates specified thereon and that inquiry was made regarding their inclusion 
in any existing negotiating unit which is the subject of the representation petition by 
reviewing the Certification list from PERB dated 1/3/96 for Local 424, and the persons 
specified thereon are currently members of said County of Oneida White 
Collar/(Administrative) Unit. 
Eugene Capico 
Sworn to before me this 
f"7 day of June, 1998. 
FREDERICK J. PFHFER 
Notary Public. State of New York 
Qualified in Onondaga Co. No. 47QM39 
Commission Expires May 31,19j£Z 
, Declarant 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 138, 138A & 138B, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4791 
VILLAGE OF KINGS POINT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Union of Operating Engineers 
Local 138, 138A & 138B has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4791 - 2 -
Unit: Included: All operating engineers, equipment operators and labor supervisor 
employed by the Village of Kings Point. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 138, 
138A and 138B. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4798 
JONESVILLE FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Full-time station-keepers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-4798 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 27, 1998 
) Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
